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The main point of this book is that religious behavior conforms to the classic supply and demand economic model. Religions sell "products" and exact "costs." Cost/benefit determines why people join or leave religious groups.

Here is a partial summary of themes.

1) Religious belief is rational because believers evaluate the costs and benefits of their religious participation. They conclude that the benefits outweigh the costs. Therefore they are rational actors.

This is really silly. It confuses participation with belief. Yes, the perceived cost/benefit ratio may justify participation from a narrow economic point of view, but this says nothing about whether the actual beliefs are rational. Under S&F's analysis, participation in suicide cults, the Flat Earth Society, and spaceship cults is rational because the believer thought about participating and then concluded that benefits outweigh costs.

The authors also fail to recognize the equivocal nature of the term "rational." They use it in a narrow economic sense. But those who think religious belief is "irrational" do not disagree with this. They say, rather, that religious belief goes beyond the evidence, requires unwarranted, blind, assumptions, etc. and is therefore irrational. S&F do not address this conception of rationality. Accordingly, skip the first chapter. It's a waste of time.

2) Religious participation is subject to market principles of supply and demand. Religions exact "costs" for their "products" and religious participants are rational actors who perform cost/benefit analysis prior to engaging in religious activity. (Costs are such things as $$$, donations of time, willingness to undergo tension with surrounding culture, celibacy, separation from society, etc. Benefits are not usually material, but involve emotional satisfaction and often expectations of rewards after bodily death.) "High tension" groups exact more costs from their participants. "Low tension" groups exact less. A bell curve shows that the MAJORITY of people want to be in medium tension groups, those in which they feel that they are making some sacrifices, (but not too many) and that they are different from the society around them (but not too different.) When Vatican II allowed nuns to dress in civies and live in apartments, recruitment dropped because nunhood was no longer so special. Women WANTED to pay the higher cost for a distinct and visible role in society. Post Vatican II they were just social workers and teachers who had to give up sex. People WANT to pay for a good religious product. If the product is watered down, they'll go somewhere else. Likewise if the product is too expensive, as in groups that require celibacy, separation from society, large financial donations, or that advocate doctrines that subject adherents to ridicule, members will leave. Thus, medium tension churches are the most successful.

When groups change from moderate tension to low or high tension, they tend to lose members. Liberal churches in the US are shrinking. When the Unitarian Universalists recently brought back some traditional elements of the liturgy, their numbers began to grow.

I would like to have been given more information on WHY folks are attracted to medium tension groups.

3) Free religious markets result in greater levels of religious participation. The United States is "the first fully unregulated religious economy." It has the highest level of religious participation. Countries with state monopolies on religion (most of Europe, including the Western democracies) have extremely low levels of participation. Pews are empty on Sunday in Sweden. Even though these countries are democracies, they restrict the abilities of unofficial groups to operate. This book contains some shocking information about the Western "democracies" and their repression and harassment of small, unofficial churches, like Jehovah's Witnesses and Pentecostals.

Competition breeds increased religious participation because churches adjust their products to what the market wants. Also, the more supply, the greater likelihood that individuals will find a "vendor" that matches their preferences.

4) Religious preferences don't change much. Change in participation comes when the SUPPLY SIDE responds to existing demand. The US has had a 65% rate of church membership for decades, irrespective of economic conditions. When people change religions or churches, it is not because their beliefs (preferences) have changed. Rather it is because the new group better appeals to their existing preferences. (This is probably a controversial point. Do they REALLY mean that religious values don't change much?)

5) Secularization theory is all wrong. Those who say religion will die as society becomes more educated have been proven wrong. The industrialized world shows that this is not happening. Even in societies with low participation, "believing without belonging" is very high. (Western Europe has high rates of religious belief, but low levels of participation.) This section could be better. Perhaps secularization IS happening, it just doesn't manifest itself in more atheism. Perhaps god is becoming less anthropomorphic, less active, and therefore less real. This could still count as evidence of secularization in a given society. The authors don't do a good job addressing this subtle point.

Overall, this book offers a believable and coherent theory as to why religions succeed or fail, and religious believers will be disturbed to find that their purportedly sacred activities are government by crass economic forces of the Adam Smith variety. Ironically, the authors come across as very pro-religion, and pro-conservative religion to boot, even appearing subtly to offer advice to the Catholic Church on how to get its act together (though they say they don't.) Their clear preference for traditional religion is annoying and inappropriate. No need to call the Jesus Seminar an exercise in "preening silliness" or make repeated to references for the alleged vapidness of liberal theology. Their scholarship does not quite cross over into advocacy, but their sympathies are tastlessly and unprofessionally evident.

Worth reading, but you may not need to now that you've read this review.

This book is packed with arguments, facts, theories, and ideas that anyone in the sociology of religion will be interested in. Stark and Finke are leaders in their discipline, and their work demands attention.

There is a lot that is good here. For example, their illustration of the ways in which social networks determine religious identity is key. I also appreciate the whole "religious economy" metaphor; indeed, religions do compete for customers these days and definitely "market" themselves, which I agree does cause more people to actually get involved. In short, advertising works -- and religions have figured that out.

I had problems with a lot of their assertions. For one: secularization. They claim that secularization theory is dumb, dillusional, and dead. Are they serious? C'mon. Just look at the data. The evidence is strong and clear: belief in God and church attendance are CLEARLy declining in places like great Britain, France, Holland, Germany (especially east germany), Czech Republic, and religion is at an all-time low in Scandinavia (!!) -- and also Japan. Secularization may not be happening in the U.S. or much of the world, but to deny its reality in most of Europe is simply blind. Look also at Jews -- most are now non-believers, even in Israel. Compare that to Jews 200 years ago -- yet another major example of secularization that S and F avoid dealing with. And also see the rates in Canada, where belief is also down (see Reginald Bibby)....for the evidence of secularization in selected countries, see the work of Steve Bruce, Grace Davie, and even the recent World Values Surveys from Inglehart, et al.

Another problem with this book is the wacky "rational choice" silliness. Please -- and these guys claim to have degrees in sociology? Rational choice theory is so pithy, so lame, so weak it is hard to believe ANYONE takes it seriously. The bottom line is that "costs" and "rewards" are subjective. And to say that people "choose" their religion is obviously true on some basic level, but it obfuscates broader cultural, historical, and social forces that make up the heart of the sociological imagination - see Phil Zuckerman's solid critique in his latest book on soc. of religion.

Finally, their clear argument in the Introduction that only persons of faith can be "truly scientific" when studying religion is laughable.