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by Caroline Kennedy-Pipe

eBook Stalin's Cold War: Soviet Strategies in Europe, 1943 to 1956 download ISBN: 071904202X
Author: Caroline Kennedy-Pipe
Publisher: Manchester Univ Pr; 1st Paperback Edition edition (May 1, 1995)
Language: English
Pages: 224
ePub: 1278 kb
Fb2: 1841 kb
Rating: 4.7
Other formats: docx doc lrf mobi
Category: Political
Subcategory: Politics and Government

Stalin's Cold War book. This work analyzes the start of the Cold War from a Soviet viewpoint, drawing on Russian sources.

Stalin's Cold War book. It challenges the prevailing orthodoxy of Western historians to show how Moscow saw the presence of US troops in Europe in the 1940s and early 1950s as advantageous, rather than as a check on Soviet ambitions.

Caroline Kennedy-Pipe. Strategies of survival - Soviet thinking about security and the West, 1917-1941 strategies of denial strategies of occupation strategies of consolidation strategies of opposition - the Soviet Union and Western military and political integration, 1949-1950 strategies of stabilization. View PDF. Save to Library.

This work analyzes the start of the Cold War from a Soviet viewpoint, drawing on Russian sources.

Items related to Stalin's Cold War: Soviet Strategies in Europe . In the first analysis of the start of the Cold War from a Soviet viewpoint, Caroline Kennedy-Pipe draws on Russian source material to reach some startling conclusions.

Items related to Stalin's Cold War: Soviet Strategies in Europe,. Caroline Kennedy-Pipe Stalin's Cold War: Soviet Strategies in Europe, 1943 to 1956. ISBN 13: 9780719042027. Stalin's Cold War: Soviet Strategies in Europe, 1943 to 1956. Caroline Kennedy-Pipe. She challenges the prevailing orthodoxy of Western historians to show how Moscow saw the presence of US troops in Europe in the 1940s and early 1950s as advantageous rather than as a check on Soviet ambitions. PO225: Europe: Politics and Ideas (Term 1, Weeks 1-7). The origins of the Cold War. Previous: Palgrave advances in Cold War history. Section: Establishment of the "Cold War System". Next: The origins of the Cold War. Library availability.

Stalin's cold war: Soviet strategies in Europe, 1943 to 1956. International history and international relations theory: A dialogue beyond the cold war. C Kennedy-Pipe. Manchester University Press, 1995. International Affairs 76 (4), 741-754, 2000.

The Cold War (1947–1953) is the period within the Cold War from the Truman Doctrine in 1947 to the conclusion of the Korean War in 1953. The Cold War emerged in Europe a few years after the successful US–USSR–UK coalition won World War II in Europe,. The Cold War emerged in Europe a few years after the successful US–USSR–UK coalition won World War II in Europe, and extended to 1989–91

Caroline KennedyPipe, Stalin's Cold War: Soviet Strategies in Europe, 1943 to 1956.

Caroline KennedyPipe, Stalin's Cold War: Soviet Strategies in Europe, 1943 to 1956. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Stalin's Cold War : Soviet Strategies in Europe, 1943-56 This work analyzes the start of the Cold War from a Soviet viewpoint . A final chapter places the book in the debate over the causes of the Cold War. show more. Format Hardback 240 pages.

Stalin's Cold War : Soviet Strategies in Europe, 1943-56. By (author) Caroline Kennedy-Pipe.

In the first analysis of the start of the Cold War from a Soviet viewpoint, Caroline Kennedy-Pipe draws on Russian source material to reach some startling conclusions. She challenges the prevailing orthodoxy of Western historians to show how Moscow saw the presence of US troops in Europe in the 1940s and early 1950s as advantageous rather than as a check on Soviet ambitions.The author points to a complex web of concerns than fuelled Moscow's actions, and explores how the Soviet leadership, and Stalin in particular, responded to American policy. She shows how the Soviet experience of the United States and Europe, both before, during and after the Second World War, led Moscow to a policy that was not simply fuelled by anti-Americanism. Six chapters cover events from the wartime conferences of 1943 until the death of Stalin. A final chapter places the book in the context of the current debate over the causes of the Cold War.
Comments: (2)
Doukree
reviewed by Johanna Granville, Clemson University, Clemson, SC USA
Caroline Kennedy-Pipe's monograph, Stalin's Cold War: Soviet Strategies in Europe, 1943 to 1956 focuses on the motives and decisions of one leader (Joseph Stalin), rather than with the outcomes or implementation of previously made decisions by people or classes of people. Kennedy-Pipe posits that generally Stalin "operated a strategy of denial" to British and American influence in East Europe in the early Cold War period. However, she surprises us by claiming that Stalin may have wished to keep a U.S. troop presence in Europe after 1943 as a check against German revanchism. Stalin, she says, was actually the first one to suggest that the Americans have a zone of occupation in Germany; Roosevelt hesitated. (Unfortunately, this assertion is not documented.) Not a revisionist, Kennedy-Pipe claims that the main purpose for the book is to "move away from the old debate about who was to blame for the Cold War, and instead to examine the nature of Soviet security requirements in Europe." She cautiously weighs the advantages of a U.S. troop presence with the disadvantages of the U.S. nuclear threat: The increasing nuclear threat to the USSR from American forces in Europe during the mid- to late-1950s obviously complicated the Soviet view of a US troop presence. The benefits to be accrued from a military-political stranglehold on Germany had to be weighed against a European nuclear threat manipulated from Washington. This paradox continued to remain one of the fundamental problems for Soviet strategies in Europe throughout the post-war period. Did the stability offered by US troops outweigh any potential threat?
Kennedy-Pipe's book contrasts particularly with other works which suggest that the citizens living under Stalin's regime, albeit afraid, continued to "participate in the public as well as private spheres of life as individuals with their own interests." In other words, the relationship between the Stalinist state and society was "not one simply of oppressor and victim." Kennedy-Pipe, on the other hand, largely disregards public opinion; she apparently believes it had little or no impact on Stalin's foreign policy. Moreover, she implicitly uses the rational actor model by assuming that Stalin's moves were all pre-meditated, each geared toward maximizing benefits and minimizing costs and risks. Given the nature of this historical Cold War period, this was a necessary methodology. Data constraints challenged Sovietologists to uncover the real motives for Soviet foreign policy behavior. They were restricted to observing overt behavior, and deducing intentions from it. The Kremlin remained a "black box." The book's weaknesses include occasional conflicting statements and lack of documentation to support controversial statements. In her conclusion, for example, Kennedy-Pipes claims that Stalin first suggested the creation of occupation zones in Germany, but earlier in chapter two, she implies that the Americans first made the suggestion, and Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov then accepted it enthusiastically. Furthermore, there are drawbacks to the rational actor model. Certainly where consideration of zones of occupation are concerned, the Soviet, American, British, and French governments stuttered and stumbled; their behavior was not always rational and intentional. Where sources are concerned, Kennedy-Pipe acknowledges in her introduction that Russian archives, like the Russian Center for the Preservation and Study of Contemporary Documentation (Moscow), have been open since 1991, but she apparently has not used newly declassified archival documents for her work. Thirdly, the author's tight focus on a chronological narrative might leave some readers hungry for more analysis of the reasons behind the decisions Stalin made. If this were a period of history that has not been covered extensively, this might be somewhat excusable. Many books, however, have been written on the early Cold War period. Kennedy-Pipe does not always specify what is new about her rendition. The book contains quite a few typographical errors as well. Nonetheless, this is a compact study that adds an interesting viewpoint about Stalin's motivations, and it would work well in an undergraduate college course.
Johanna Granville, Clemson University
Clonanau
From the Second World War through to his death, this book provides the context behind and reasons for Stalin's actions and reactions. A great text for academics, students and history buffs.