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eBook Truth in Context: An Essay on Pluralism and Objectivity download

by Michael P. Lynch

eBook Truth in Context: An Essay on Pluralism and Objectivity download ISBN: 026212212X
Author: Michael P. Lynch
Publisher: A Bradford Book (December 22, 1998)
Language: English
Pages: 196
ePub: 1772 kb
Fb2: 1244 kb
Rating: 4.9
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Category: Political
Subcategory: Philosophy

Michael Lynch has written a very clear case for alethic pluralism. Michael Lynch has done a great service by clearly laying out the consequences of pluralism. 5 people found this helpful.

Michael Lynch has written a very clear case for alethic pluralism. The argument of the book is that metaphysical pluralism is compatible with realism about truth. Realism about truth is the idea that truth is a property, specifically a relational property as in the correspondence theory of truth. A proposition is true if the world corresponds to what the proposition says about the world.

In Truth in Context, Michael Lynch argues that there is a middle path, one where metaphysical pluralism is consistent with . Lynch wants to distinguish his pluralist view, which involves the This is a strange but intriguing little book

In Truth in Context, Michael Lynch argues that there is a middle path, one where metaphysical pluralism is consistent with a robust realism about truth. Drawing on the work of Hilary Putnam, . Quine, and Ludwig Wittgenstein, among others, Lynch develops an original version of metaphysical pluralism, which he calls relativistic Kantianism. Lynch wants to distinguish his pluralist view, which involves the This is a strange but intriguing little book. It’s written in a breezy style that doesn’t stop to examine all the usual technical controversies. Sometimes that’s infuriating, but other times it’s totally refreshing.

Truth - For other uses, see Truth (disambiguation). James, William - American pragmatism James . Tiles THE BERKELEY LECTURE Pragmatism was introduced to society in a lecture given by William James1 to the Philosophical Union at the University of California in Berkeley on 26 August 1898. 2 In his lecture Jame. History of philosophy.

A Choice Outstanding Academic Title for 1999 Academic debates about pluralism and truth have become increasingly polarized in recent years. One side embraces extreme relativism, deeming any talk of objective truth as philosophically naïve. The opposition, frequently arguing that any sort of relativism leads to nihilism, insists on an objective notion of truth according to which there is only one true story of the world. Both sides agree that there is no middle path.

In Truth in Context, Michael Lynch argues that there is a middle path, one where metaphysical pluralism is consistent with a robust realism about truth. He argues that one can take facts and propositions as relative without implying that our ordinary concept of truth is a relative, epistemic, or "soft" concept. The truths may be relative, but our concept of truth need not be. Hardcover.

Michael Patrick Lynch. MIT Press, 1998 - Objectivity. The Faces of Pluralism. 9. Understanding Conceptual Schemes.

Truth in Context: An Essay on Pluralism and Objectivity. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy is not only widely acknowledged to be his most important book, but also hailed a contemporary classic of moral philosophy. Three Models of Conceptual Schemes. Presenting a sustained critique of moral theory from Kant onwards, Williams reorients ethical theory towards 'truth, truthfulness and the meaning of an individual life'. He explores and reflects upon the most difficult problems in contemporary philosophy and identifies new ideas about central issues such as relativism, objectivity and the possibility of ethical knowledge. The Internet of US: Knowing More and Understanding Less in the Age of Big Data. True to life: Why truth matters. The nature of truth: Classic and contemporary perspectives. Liveright/ WW Norton, 2016. A functionalist theory of truth. Truth and multiple realizability. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3), 384-408, 2004.

A Choice Outstanding Academic Title for 1999

Academic debates about pluralism and truth have become increasingly polarized in recent years. One side embraces extreme relativism, deeming any talk of objective truth as philosophically naïve. The opposition, frequently arguing that any sort of relativism leads to nihilism, insists on an objective notion of truth according to which there is only one true story of the world. Both sides agree that there is no middle path.

In Truth in Context, Michael Lynch argues that there is a middle path, one where metaphysical pluralism is consistent with a robust realism about truth. Drawing on the work of Hilary Putnam, W.V.O. Quine, and Ludwig Wittgenstein, among others, Lynch develops an original version of metaphysical pluralism, which he calls relativistic Kantianism. He argues that one can take facts and propositions as relative without implying that our ordinary concept of truth is a relative, epistemic, or "soft" concept. The truths may be relative, but our concept of truth need not be.

Comments: (3)
Gholbirdred
Michael Lynch has written a very clear case for alethic pluralism. The argument of the book is that metaphysical pluralism is compatible with realism about truth. Realism about truth is the idea that truth is a property, specifically a relational property as in the correspondence theory of truth. A proposition is true if the world corresponds to what the proposition says about the world. Metaphysical pluralism is the idea that there are equally true yet incompatible metaphysical accounts of the world. So the project, simply put, is to combine realism with relativism.
Lynch's book flows well in style and content and it deserves praise for that alone. The argument is clearly stated. Lynch's argument has two main points. First that existence could not be a property or predicate. Second that conceptual relativity implies metaphysical pluralism. If Lynch is right about these two points, the argument goes thorough.
The argument for the first point is simple. Existence couldn't be a property since all objects exist and there is no property that could differentiate existing from non-existing objects. This is because to exist is just to instantiate properties. Since non-existing objects don't exist, they can't have any properties. Therefore existence could not be a property. What falls out from this argument is the idea that existence is metaphysically indeterminate. It is flux and has no "essence" or "nature." And if existence has no absolute essence then objects and later down the line, concepts about objects can't have an essence. Concepts do not have necessary and sufficient application conditions. Concepts themselves are context dependent for their content and can be stretched in incompatible yet equally true ways.
The second main argument is that conceptual relativity, the idea that the meaning of concepts is relative to conceptual schemes or paradigms implies metaphysical pluralism. First Lynch argues that conceptual relativism implies fact relativism.
If facts and concepts are relativism to schemes, and there are a plurality of schemes, then it follows that there is a plurality of equally true yet incompatible metaphysical accounts of the world.
Lynch's book has two main flaws. His argument against existence having an essence engages only a contemporary analytic notion of essence and existence from Russell and Frege. He never considers other candidates in the history of philosophy. That is, he endorses an Avicennian/Scotist account of esse essentiae and ignores other accounts, say the Thomistic account of esse existentiae. The first account considers essence apart from any possible act of existence, essences are completely separated from the act of being. On such an account it would be impossible for existence to have an essence. (For more on this see Etienne Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers) Furthermore, there are contemporary analytic philosophers who do argue within the Russellian/Fregian tradition that existence could be a property. For example, Colin McGinn (Logical Properties) has argued that existence could be a property and that this is the best way to understand the existential quantifier. For example, if existence just is property instantiation, how do we understand properties prior to their instantiation? Do they exist or no? Moreover, the concept of instantiation includes the concept of existence. To be instantiated just is to exist. So it seems plausible to think that Lynch is clearly wrong. Existence could be a property.
Part of the argument for the plurality of schemes requires a rejection of the incommensurability thesis (IT), that is, that there is no common ground between conceptual schemes. The argument against (IT)is that if IT were true communication between conceptual schemes would be impossible. But, per modus tollens, we do communicate between conceptual schemes, therefore IT is false. Since IT is false, it is possible to have a plurality of conceptual schemes. Lynch's argument here is flawed since it is based on the conflation of two concepts, commonality and neutrality. Lynch conflates a lack of neutral ground with a lack of common ground. But IT only requires a rejection of neutral ground, not common ground. Therefore his argument against IT fails since it is possible to have common ground between conceptual schemes (and therefore communication), just not neutral ground. Since IT requires common metaphysical ground, this rules out the possibility of a plurality of metaphysically discrete conceptual schemes. IT implies then that there is one overall scheme to which all facts and content are relative too. Hence conceptual relativity along with fact relativity does not imply metaphysical pluralism.
Lynch's position is essentially a modern version of Protagoreanism. Protagoras held that all appearances of the world to each individual were equally true. In order to pull this off, Protagoras was required to endorse a Heraclitus' notion of the world as flux(metaphysically indeterminate).(See Myles Burnyeat, The Theaetetus of Plato) And this is why Lynch's position requires that existence couldn't be a property. The book is helpful in getting clear as to what relativism implies, but the argument fails.
Blackbeard
Michael Lynch has done a great service by clearly laying out the consequences of pluralism. this is the best account of truth and pluralism currently available.
Cheber
In TRUTH IN CONTEXT, Lynch does something rare, he offers a genuinely new theory of truth. At the same time he gives us a new way to think about pluralism and relativism in philosophy. Especially good are the discussions of Conceptual Schemes and the two level account of truth as a functional property.