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by Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities

eBook The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction: Report to the President of the United States download ISBN: 1419614568
Author: Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities
Publisher: BookSurge Publishing (September 6, 2005)
Language: English
Pages: 704
ePub: 1274 kb
Fb2: 1859 kb
Rating: 4.6
Other formats: rtf lrf mobi mbr
Category: History
Subcategory: Military

While the intelligence services of many other nations also thought that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, in. .

While the intelligence services of many other nations also thought that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, in the end it was the United States that put its credibility on the line, making this one of the most public-and most e failures in recent American history. Was the failure in Iraq typical of the Community's performance? Or was Iraq, as one senior intelligence official told the Commission, a sort of "perfect storm"-a one-time breakdown caused by a rare confluence of events that conspired to create a bad result? In our view, it was neither. The failures we found in Iraq are not repeated everywhere.

The Commission, following intense study of the Intelligence Community, delivered its report to the President . The 601-page document detailed many . intelligence failures and identified intelligence breakdowns in dozens of cases.

The Commission, following intense study of the Intelligence Community, delivered its report to the President on March 31, 2005. Some of the conclusions reached by the report were: the report notes in several places that the commission's mandate did not allow it "to investigate how policymakers used the intelligence they received from the Intelligence Community on Iraq's weapons programs,".

On February 6, 2004, President George W. Bush created the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of. Bush created the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction to advise and assist him in performing his presidential duties. This report analyzes the establishment and organizational requirements set forth in the presidential mandate, and its relationship to the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA). On March 31, 2005, the commission submitted its final report to the President, which contained 74 recommendations for reforming the . intelligence community.

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Redirected from Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction). President George W. Bush in February 2004.

Executive Office of the President; and the Commission on.

Executive Office of the President; and the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction. On the brink of war, and in front of the whole world, the United States government asserted that Saddam Hussein had reconstituted his nuclear weapons program, had biological weapons and mobile biological weapon production facilities, and had stockpiled and was producing chemical weapons. All of this was based on the assessments of the . And not one bit of it could be confirmed when the war was over. Paperback: 618 pages.

d) The Commission shall submit to the President by March 31, 2005, a report of the findings of the Commission resulting from its examination and its specific recommendations for ensuring that the Intelligence Community of the United States is sufficiently authorized, organized.

d) The Commission shall submit to the President by March 31, 2005, a report of the findings of the Commission resulting from its examination and its specific recommendations for ensuring that the Intelligence Community of the United States is sufficiently authorized, organized, equipped, trained, and resourced to identify and warn in a timely manner of, and to support United States Government efforts to. respond to, the development and transfer of knowledge, expertise, technologies, materials, and resources associated with the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, related means of de.

Report to the President of the United States. Our report offers 74 recommendations for improving the . Intelligence Community (all but a handhl of which we believe can be implemented without statutory change). Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction. But among these recommendations a few points merit special emphasis. We conclude that the Intelligence Community was dead wrong in almost all of its pre-warjudgments about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. This was a major intelligence failure.

The Final Report of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction was released March 31, 2005. Read the full report. In a scathing report," the Commission said that "America's spy agencies were 'dead wrong' in most of their judgments about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction before the war and that the United States knows 'disturbingly little' about nuclear threats posed by many of its most dangerous adversaries.

Counsel, Commission on the Street, S. Room 1–C804, Washington, Intelligence Capabilities of the United DC 20554 or via the Internet to Judith- BILLING CODE 6560–50–P States Regarding Weapons of Mass . [email protected]

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The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction
Comments: (3)
Folsa
The 2005 Report of "The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction" is a remarkably detailed resource document for intelligence professionals and for those in academia, the media, and government who monitor the intelligence community. It is the unclassified output of a bi-partisan group charged by the President with determining how the U.S. Intelligence Community collectively failed to accurately assess Iraqi WMD capabilities prior to the 2003 invasion by the U.S. and its allies.

The Commission answers its primary question in blunt detail. Simply put, the intelligence community based its assessment of Iraq on incomplete and sometimes inaccurate data, faulty assumptions, less than rigorous analysis, and less than imaginative collection. The intelligence community, having significantly underestimated Iraq's WMD capabilities prior to the first Gulf War in 1991, displayed a tendency to favor worst-case interpretations of the limited data available between 1991 and 2003. Their cause was not helped by a persistent and often successful effort by Saddam Hussein's regime to confuse and deny U.S. collection efforts, making Iraq an extremely hard target.

Through a comparision of intelligence efforts against Iraq with similar efforts against Libya, Afghanhistan, North Korea, and Iran, finds much to critique in how the Intelligence Community did business at that time. This critique takes the form of a series of recommendations for the reform of the U.S. intelligence community. These recommendations include designating a Director of National Intelligence and giving that individual the staff and authority to organize and integrate intelligence community activities in the form of collection, analysis, and coordination against the nation's most obvious opponents. Many of these recommendations have been subsequently implemented through legislation and executive order. The Commission report provides the detailed rationale for the reforms. The need for reform was not new; the failures of 9/11 and Iraq provided the necessary momentum for implementation.

The Commission report is nearly 700 pages of fairly dry reading,some of which has been summarized in media reports and in specialized accounts by intelligence community monitors such as Jeffrey Richelson. Nevertheless, the report provides fascinating insights into how the community does, or doesn't, do business. The report has no photgraphs, graphics or other presentations; the resizing of the text to fit the publication format has left behind an annoying number of hyphenated words.

This book is highly recommended as a resource document to intelligence professionals and those who monitor the intelligence community.
Whiteseeker
Excellent condition. Really good government summation of much research on the subject.
Dagdage
Measure twice, cut once.

Perhaps we should examine the classic meaning of "Intelligence". Assess accurately then act prudently.

We will never have a perfect understanding of the capabilities of nations and actors that intend to do us great harm. We can learn from our mistakes and improve our intelligence gathering system.