eBook The Battle of the Generals: The Untold Story of the Falaise Pocket-The Campaign That Should Have Won World War II download

"The Battle of the Generals: The Untold Story of the Falaise Pocket - The Campaign That Should Have Won World War II," by Martin Blumenson, William Morrow and Company, New York, 1993.

Martin Blumenson's book is one of the best on the Battle of the Falaise Gap. He is an excellant writer and has been researching WW II history in the European Theater almost since the war ended. For 60 plus years the powers that be in military history have "poo-pooed" any claim that the Battle of the Falaise Gap was anything less than a great victory. The Allies killed over 10,000 Germans in the pocket, they captured another 50,000 and barely 20,000 to 40,000 of the enemy managed to escape while leaving all of their heavy weapons and vehicles behind. Flush with public adoration for their victory over the German Nazis, Allied generals and their friends writing the history books have repeated this rosey scenario ad nauseam since the end of the war.

Ladislas Farago's book on George Patton (Patton: 1964) and Carlo D'Este's book "Decision in Normandy" (1983) both challenged the official version of events. But it was Canadian Major General Richard Rohmer's book "Patton's Gap" in 1981 that really raised questions. General Rohmer was, to my knowlwdge, the first writer to publish the Forrest Pogue interview with Montgomery's intelligence officer E.T. Williams, where Williams told Pogue he was there when Montgomery ordered US General Bradley to halt his forces on the inter-Army Group boundary line south of Argentan. The official version of events had Bradley issuing the halt order to Patton because he did not think Patton was strong enough with only the 5 divisions in Haislips' XV Corps to complete the 14 mile drive to Falaise while holding a firm shoulder at Argentan. Rohmer's book changed everything.

Martin Blumenson gets a lot of it right, but he does make a few mistakes. He wrote, for example, that "... Montgomery's army group boundary was a nonissue." p. 213. If the inter-Army Group boundary was a nonissue, why did Bradley hold his forces south of that line for a week. And why didn't he take the road net at Argentan, the high ground northeast of Argentan and the wonderful ridge line at St Leonard - all were tactically critical and were just a few miles inside Montgomery's boundary line on the British side. Statements from British Air Marshals Coningham and Tedder in Antony Beevor's "D-Day, The Battle for Normandy," Air Vice Marshal Stephen C. Strafford in his diary, Sir Francis De Guingand in "Operation Victory" and the E.T. Williams interview all suggest the boundary restrictions were imposed on Bradley by Montgomery.

Blumenson repeats Bradley's claim that at the Falaise Gap the Allies were confused by a lack of knowledge about the Germans. p. 218. Ronald Lewin in "ULTRA Goes to War" (p. 342) and F. W. Winterbotham in The ULTRA Secret (p. 148-158) were both convinced that any intelligence failures at the Falaise Gap were not due to a lack of information about the Germans.

Blumenson is one of the few historians who gets Montgomery right. "Montgomery seemed to have lost the firm grasp, the master's touch ... he had heretofore displayed, particularly in North Africa. Of the verve and arrogance ... only the arrogance was visible. He seemed tired and dispirited in Normandy. Perhaps the campaign in June and July did him in. Perhaps the developments in August overwhelmed him." p. 264. Blumenson goes on to discuss the attempt by senior officers at Supreme Allied Headquarters to remove Montgmery from command. "The objections (about Montgomery's performance) leading to his (proposed) removal centered not only on Montgomery's smugness and narrowness but also on his operational mediocrity in an Allied setting. It was that which made him ineligible to command a sizable number of American divisions." p. 266.

The pace of battle in June and July 1944 was very slow. The front lines barely moved. This was the pace of battle preferred by the general who liked his set-piece battles. But when the Americans turned the German's western flank at the end of July, the pace of battle quickened. It became commonplace to see Patton's Army moving 20, 30 or even 50 miles a day. The quicker pace of battle seemed to unnerve Montgomery. Blumenson wrote, "The lure of Falaise on Montgomery was strong and constant. In August he changed his instructions on who was to take it no less than five times... His inconsistency on Falaise paralleled his lack of firm decision on how to trap the Germans in Normandy." p. 217. One suspects that Blumenson badly wants to tell the truth about the Battle of the Falaise Gap, but has developed an emotional and intellectual attachment to historical record he helped to create. "The Battle of the Generals" is a must read, and Blumenson gets an easy 5 stars because he has gotten most of it right. For a further discussion of the Battle of the Falaise Gap please see "Patton's Gap" and "Eisenhower and Montgomery at the Falaise Gap."

Martin has done a thorough job of telling the story of the rivalry between Ike, Monty, and Bradley and how it affected the battle for Normandy after the invasion. Martin had special insight into them because he was a WWII historian at the time. It may be a bit detailed for some, but the personalities involved make the book a good read.

Interesting military history book

A very good and insightful view of the failures at the highest levels of command.

Very detailed and puts the entire normandy campaign in perspective. a good read.

Where are the maps, man?!? While this is an enjoyable and informative book, it is reduced in estimation by the lack of maps. Geez louise, will someone tell these authors to include maps?

When I bought this book, I couldn't help but wonder if it would validate my long-held beliefs about the Allies' top three generals in Europe during World War II (Eisenhower, Montgomery, and Bradley) and their subordinate, General George S. Patton Jr. --- views which I had formed as a boy by reading newspapers, watching newsreels, listening to the radio and over-hearing adult conversations as the war progressed.

As it turns out, it does much more than that. It delivers a detailed history of the early stages of the war in Europe AND confirms my long-held beliefs. And by reviewing the personal reflections of these four men --- in their notes, journals, letters, etc. --- it also appears that, unbeknownst to one another, they, too, viewed each other in much the same way. But, sadly, it does one other, more important, thing. It effectively proves that by their actions, inactions, and ineptitude, and by ignoring the urgings of General Patton, these three top-level generals: 1) failed to capture or destroy the bulk of the German Army in France, leaving them to regroup and live to fight another day, thus prolonging the war by several months, and 2) in all probability caused the deaths of tens-of- thousands of Allied and Germany soldiers in what would have been unnecessary battles.

So, what views were confirmed? General Eisenhower appears to have been more of a politician, administrator, and coordinator than a military leader. During the battles discussed in this book, he delegated his military responsibilities to Montgomery and spent most of his time ensuring that the Allies continued to collaborate. Perhaps, as a military man, he had reached the level of his incompetence, since there is some question as to whether or not he really understood the battle plans he was approving. Montgomery was an arrogant self-serving general who seems to have been more concerned about his own legacy than about the war. Many thought he should have been sacked, but that was impossible since he was the figurehead of the British Army. One leader, however, nailed it when he noted that Montgomery was the strongest believer in his own myth. Bradley is something of a shadowy figure, at least at this time. He was elevated to this position, over Patton, because Patton was in political exile. Due to his inexperience, however, he lacked confidence and was subservient to Montgomery with his exalted reputation. And finally: Patton, America's greatest fighting general, was the only general at the time who fully understood what was happening, what needed to be done and how, and had the will to do it. Unfortunately, he was unable to convince his superior, Bradley, and the other generals, so the war went on.

In concluding this book, the author theorizes on what course the war might have taken if Patton had not been in exile and instead stood in Bradley's place --- as Montgomery's equal. His conclusion is that the German Army would likely have been destroyed in France, the war ended much sooner, and thousands of lives saved. I have to agree. This is a great book. I hope you read it.