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eBook Economic Behavior and Institutions: Principles of Neoinstitutional Economics (Cambridge Surveys of Economic Literature) download

by Thrainn Eggertsson

eBook Economic Behavior and Institutions: Principles of Neoinstitutional Economics (Cambridge Surveys of Economic Literature) download ISBN: 052134445X
Author: Thrainn Eggertsson
Publisher: Cambridge University Press; 1 edition (June 29, 1990)
Language: English
Pages: 400
ePub: 1287 kb
Fb2: 1946 kb
Rating: 4.1
Other formats: doc txt rtf mbr
Category: Different
Subcategory: Business and Finance

Economic behavior and institutions. University of Iceland.

Economic behavior and institutions. and the cost of measurement . Transaction costs and equilibrium outcomes. Principles of Neoinstitutional Economics. Eggertsson, Thráinn 1993. The Economics of Institutions: Avoiding the Open-Field Syndrome and the Perils of Path Dependence. Acta Sociologica, Vol. 36, Issue.

Thrainn Eggertsson's goals in "Economic Behavior and Institutions" are modest: move beyond the neoclassical framework of perfect rationality and costless complete contracting, but only a little way beyond: assume positive transaction costs, and see what happens. It is a fine introduction to 40 or 50 years of transaction-cost economics, starting with Coase. Eggertsson shows us that the work of many economists can be made coherent in the light of transaction costs.

Economic Behavior and Institutions book. The theoretical discussion is accompanied by empirical studies dealing with a range of institutions and economic systems.

Economic Behavior and Institutions: Principles of Neoinstitutional Economics (Cambridge Surveys of Economic Literature). Download (pdf, . 3 Mb) Donate Read.

Cambridge University Press (1990).

The body of work emerging from this. Cambridge University Press (1990).

The body of work emerging from this new line of inquiry includes contributions from the various branches of economic theory, such as the economics of property rights, the theory of the firm, cliometrics and law and economics.

SAN JOSÉ STATE UNIVERSITY ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT Thayer Watkins. Notes on: Economic Behavior and Institutions by Thrainn Eggertsson, Cambridge Surveys of Economic Literature, Cambridge University Press, 1991. aimed at generalizing microeconomic theory while retaining all the essential elements of the economic approach - stable preferences, the rational-choice model, and equilibria.

Cambridge Surveys of Economic Literature.

This button opens a dialog that displays additional images for this product with the option to zoom in or out. Tell us if something is incorrect. Economic Behavior and Institutions : Principles of Neoinstitutional Economics. This book is a comprehensive survey of 'neoinstitutional economics', which integrates different economic theories. Economic Behavior and Institutions. Cambridge Surveys of Economic Literature. Cambridge University Press.

Tráinn Eggertsson (1990), Economic behavior and institutions: Principles of Neoinstitutional Economics. This book grew out of my interest in organizational forms and institutional arrangements and their impact on economic outcomes

Tráinn Eggertsson (1990), Economic behavior and institutions: Principles of Neoinstitutional Economics. This book grew out of my interest in organizational forms and institutional arrangements and their impact on economic outcomes. Price theory or microeconomics, in its conventional form, treats organizations and institutions the same way as it treats the law of gravity: These factors are implicitly assumed to exist but appear neither as independent nor as dependent variables in the models. Such economy in model making can be eminently reasonable.

An important new research program has developed in economics that extends neoclassical economic theory in order to examine the effects of institutions on economic behavior. The body of work emerging from this new line of inquiry includes contributions from the various branches of economic theory, such as the economics of property rights, the theory of the firm, cliometrics and law and economics. This book is the first comprehensive survey of this research program, which the author terms "neoinstitutional economics." The author proposes a unified approach to this research, integrating the work of various contributors and emphasizing the common principles of inquiry that tie the work together. The theoretical discussion is accomplished by empirical studies dealing with a whole range of institutions and economic systems.
Comments: (2)
Bearus
Prompt delivery, nice goods. Thanks.
Meztihn
I didn't realize how very excellent this book was until I thought about it for a while and let its tastes stew together with those of Schelling's "Micromotives and Macrobehavior".

Thrainn Eggertsson's goals in "Economic Behavior and Institutions" are modest: move beyond the neoclassical framework of perfect rationality and costless complete contracting, but only a little way beyond: assume positive transaction costs, and see what happens. It is a fine introduction to 40 or 50 years of transaction-cost economics, starting with Coase. Eggertsson shows us that the work of many economists can be made coherent in the light of transaction costs. Some examples:

* Akerlof's market for lemons. If you didn't need to spend any time investigating the quality of a used car before buying it, because the car's quality was instantly apparent, there would be no market-for-lemons problem.
* Coase: corporations wouldn't be necessary if contracting were costless. Corporations exist because buying all your industrial inputs, contracting for labor and so forth entail positive costs. There comes a point when it's cheaper to forego the free market and bring all of this work in house. That point is where corporations spring to life.
* The principal-agent problem: in a world of perfect, costless information, shareholders would instantly know whether the executives they've hired to monitor a company are doing a good job; bosses wouldn't have to do any work to detect shirking, and hence would lose much of their value; voters would know whether their elected representatives are doing what they were sent to do. Organizations like the ACLU that keep tabs on my senators when I don't have the time to would cease to exist. What binds all these cases together is that there's a principal (shareholders, bosses, watchdogs), an agent (executives, workers, representatives), and a conflict between the desires of the former and the desires of the latter. This conflict disappears in a world of perfect information.
* Most fascinating to me: money itself -- that is, something like a dollar bill that is valueless on its own, but in which the value of all other goods can be expressed -- is unnecessary in a world without transaction costs. If you wanted the cars that I sold and I wanted your grain, we would instantly know the quality of each other's products, instantly trade, and be done. Why bother with all the costs involved in supporting a currency (among which is the cost of preventing counterfeiting) if you can barter costlessly? But of course you cannot: you don't know that my cars are high-quality and I don't know that your grain is tasty.

These are all stories, of course. Corporations could come about for other reasons, as could currency. But they're good stories, and they're probably falsifiable. Eggertsson doesn't spend much time on the data itself; it's almost certain, though, that the many authors he cites have spent that time. Economic Behavior and Institutions is valuable mostly as a pointer to further work in areas that might interest the reader. If you're interested in basically any part of microeconomics, there's something in here for you. Its reach even extends, as the examples above show, into regions like political science that might seem remote from economics. It's a joy to read, and like Micromotives it shows what fun economics can be if handled right.